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Abstract—Modern malware evolves various detection avoid-
ance techniques to bypass the state-of-the-art detection methods.
An emerging trend to deal with this issue is the combination
of image transformation and machine learning techniques to
classify and detect malware. However, existing works in this
field only perform simple image transformation methods that
limit the accuracy of the detection. In this paper, we introduce a
novel approach to classify malware by using a deep network on
images transformed from binary samples. In particular, we first
develop a novel hybrid image transformation method to convert
binaries into color images that convey the binary semantics.
The images are trained by a deep convolutional neural network
that later classifies the test inputs into benign or malicious
categories. Through the extensive experiments, our proposed
method surpasses all baselines and achieves 99.14% in terms
of accuracy on the testing set.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of new malware and variants on the Internet
has been continuously increasing. According to a technical
report from Kaspersky Lab [1], 323,000 new malware files
are detected daily, and there are one billion unique malware
files in their cloud database. This significant growth is due
to the existing of many automatic malware creation toolkits
such as Zeus and SpyEye [2]. These kits commonly employ
different evading techniques such as encryption, obfuscation,
packing to create new malware from existing malware samples
to bypass the detection of anti-malware scanners [2].
In recent years, machine learning and deep learning tech-
niques have been adopted to the malware classification domain
by researchers and anti-malware vendors to capture the mal-
ware evading techniques [2], [3] (the next section discusses
the detailed related work). Machine learning algorithms in
malware classification are based on a set of features extracted
from file samples by static and/or dynamic analysis techniques.
The analyses require either the disassembly code or code
execution, and the accuracy of these models is, therefore,
dependent on the analysis tools and selected features from
the analyses. Also, the analysis and feature selecting process
sometimes need security experts to revise and disambiguate
intermediate results, thus cannot be fully automated [1], [4].
An alternative approach to overcoming the limitations men-
tioned above was the adoption of image processing and clas-
sification techniques to the domain of malware. The principal
tenet of this approach is that it does not require disassembly
code or code execution since binary files are converted and
mapped to images so that it can be resilient to the known
anti-analysis techniques [4], [5].
Although image-based is a new approach for malware clas-
sification that can avoid anti-analysis techniques, the existing
works in this domain e.g., [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] use simple
mapping algorithms to transform malware binaries to images.
Thus the semantics of the malware may be disregarded. Our
observation is that the more information given to classifiers,
the more accuracy rate can be archived. Motivated by this, our
work proposes a novel hybrid image transformation method
for binaries for malware classification. Our new technique
tackles the semantic issue by adding and highlighting essential
sequences visually using the entropy technique. A binary file
is transformed into a color image where its channels encode
semantic information. By visualizing continuous sequences
of same semantic entropy values, the image can highlight
suspicious sections in a binary for further analysis such as
packed or encrypted sections or small cryptographic artifacts
like decryption keys or passwords which meant to be hidden
from human view. Our approach starts with a simple color
scheme where bytes are classified into a small number of
categories to get an overview of the structure of a file. This
approach allows us to select the best color scheme to represent
the semantic meaning of the binary data, Then, we take the
byte stream and split them into 32-bit blocks and calculate the
Shannon entropy on them. Using the second scheme, we can
locate encrypted or packed sections. Taken from 256 different
byte values, we compress them down into a few common
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character classes and calculate byte entropy over a sliding
window of these selected bytes. Each of these color schemes
has its own advantages in representing malware behavior.
The character class scheme covers the most common padding
bytes, nicely highlights strings in malware while the entropy
scheme will locate encrypted and compressed sections.
To automatically recognize malware variants, their shared
patterns should be identified and learned. If malware authors
make a small change in the original binary, its image retains
the global structure [2]. Thus, image representations of dif-
ferent binaries from the same malware family appear to be
similar. Based on these observations, we have developed a
deep neural network to learn the global patterns shared among
malware.
Our proposed method consists of the following steps in
a supervised training phase. First, we divide a given binary
executable (benign or malicious) into blocks of sequence and
calculate the Shanon entropy value for each block. Next,
these blocks are analyzed conditionally and assigned to the
corresponding color. The transformed images are fed into con-
volutional/pooling/fully connected layers. Finally, the network
outputs the predicted label. In summary, the contributions of
our work are as follows.
• We propose a novel image transformation method to
convert binary executables into color images that convey
the semantics of the binary data.
• We develop a Convolutional Transformation Network, or
CTN in short, for classifying malware based on trans-
formed images.
• We report the experimental results of our proposed net-
work on a large dataset of malicious and benign binary
samples. Through extensive experiments, our proposed
method achieves 99.14% of accuracy, a much greater rate
compared with similar work on the same test set.
The composition of this paper is as follows: Section II
describes related work on malware analysis, detection, and
classification methods. In Section III, a malware analysis
using color images is proposed, and Section IV illustrates the
experimental results. Finally, the conclusions of this paper are
presented, and future work is discussed in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first review the progress of image clas-
sification. Then, we summarize the malware classification and
the integration of the image transformation into the malware
classification.
A. Image classification
Image classification is a fundamental problem in computer
vision. In the early stage, Haralick et al. [11] describes some
easily computable textural features based on gray-tone spatial
dependencies and illustrates their application in category-
identification tasks. Later, LeCun et al. [12] proposed Con-
volutional neural networks (ConvNets or CNNs) by stacking
several convolutional operators into a network. CNNs can
create a hierarchy of progressively more abstract features and
show a good performance on hand-writing digit classification.
However, the limitation of hardware resource has restricted
CNNs from further investigation. Therefore, there exist many
works using hand-crafted features for image classification.
In the global scale, GIST [13] is computed over the entire
image as a global image descriptor for scene classification. In
the local scale, Lowe [14] introduced SIFT feature extracted
from interest points. Similarly, Dalal et al. [15] proposed
histogram of gradients (HOG) which can be used for both
image classification and object detection in a sliding window
manner.
Recently, along with the development of GPUs, CNNs
were resurrected in deep learning for image classification.
Krizhevsky et al. [16] trained a large, deep convolutional neu-
ral network to classify the 1.2 million high-resolution images
in the ImageNet LSVRC-2010 contest into the 1000 different
classes. The network has many layers, namely, convolution
layers and max-pooling layers, and fully-connected layers
with a final 1000-class softmax. Furthermore, there are many
extensions to deeper networks for higher performance in terms
of classification rate [17], [18], [19].
B. Malware Classification
Malware classification is a method to detect whether a
given software program is malicious. Conventional techniques
in the anti-malware industry used signature-based algorithms,
however, these techniques cannot detect new malware or mod-
ified malware using evading techniques such as encryption,
packing, polymorphism, obfuscation, and meta-morphism [2],
[3]. To detect these new type of malware, in recent years, there
have been various efforts to adopt advanced machine learning
techniques in the domain of malware classification. In this
subsection, we summary latest efforts in this area. We also
highlight several works closely related our work that adopted
image classification techniques to detect malware.
1) Feature-based Approach: These classification tech-
niques first extract various features from file samples and
use these features to train the classifier using machine learn-
ing methods. Feature extraction can be performed by static
analysis, dynamic analysis, or a hybrid combination of the
two. Static analysis techniques performed a string search
on the program to collect some features. Many efforts used
static analysis to construct a feature vector for classification
such as [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25]. The limitations of
static analysis are that static-based features suffer from binary
obfuscation and are limited in representing true behavior of
malware. Moreover, these techniques are platform-specific and
only applicable to Windows PE. Various other works used
dynamic techniques to extract features from operations on
system resources [26], [27], call sequences [28], control flow
or function call graph [29]. According to recent findings, e.g.,
[3], [30], [31] features-based malware classification methods
are still facing evading techniques implemented in modern
malware.
2) Image-based Approach: There have been several efforts
that adapt the techniques in image processing to malware
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 Fig. 1. Visualization of a sample using different transformation schemes.
classification. In [2], [4], various visualization techniques,
including image processing for malware analysis, have been
surveyed. Lately, more efforts are adopting the image-based
approach for malware classification, e.g., [7], [8], [9], [10]. A
common feature of these efforts is that they transform binary
malware samples into different image forms, then image
classification techniques are used to classify the malware based
on the image representation of the malware. We highlight a
few works closely related to ours and categorize them based
on the image transformation methods and the representation
of the malware in images. In [6], [32], the binary samples are
mapped to a vector of 8-bit unsigned integers of byte values,
which is reshaped and converted into a gray-scale image in the
range [0,255]. The malware classification is calculated using
computed texture features from the images using K-nearest
neighbors. Han et al. [33], [34] proposed several transforma-
tion methods to convert the opcode sequences extracted from
malware samples into image matrices represented in RGB-
colored pixels. In a later work of the same authors [9], binaries
are converted into bitmap images, which are then converted
to entropy graphs to calculate the similarities. This approach
however, only works for Windows PE file because it needs PE
header information to decide sections to be converted. Besides,
this method cannot deal with packed samples. Liu et al. [8]
proposed a method to transform disassembly files to gray-
scale images, which are later compressed and mapped into
feature vectors for classification using K-means and diversity
selection. In [10], malware is executed on a virtual machine to
capture user-mode API calls, which are then sorted assigned a
color based on their maliciousness. The most malicious APIs
such as DeleteFileA are assigned hot colors (stars from red
(1,0,0) in RGB) while the most benign APIs are mapped to
cold colors (the coldest color is blue (0,0,1) in RGB). The API
color points at the time they appear in log trace are rendered
into an image that is used to classify the maliciousness.
Kancherla et al. [35] plots raw bytes values into 2-D dimen-
sional images and extract intensity, Wavelet, and Gabor-based
features. These features are then fed into the SVM classifier
to do malware classification. Our work stands apart from the
literature by introducing a novel transformation method to
convert binaries to images with multiple layers. Thanks to this
approach, more features of binaries are carried in the images,
resulting in a higher accuracy rate of classification compared
with existing works.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we introduce our proposed Convolutional
Transformation Network (CTN) for malware classification.
Our network consists of two major components, namely, input
transformation and convolutional network-based classification.
A. Motivation
Malware uses obfuscation technique to bypass Antivirus and
hide its malicious activities. To better capture their behavior,
we not only use static features like strings, imports but also
need to understand the encoding techniques. The output of
the malware detection system can give a better intuition of
malware to users rather than giving a single decision. In other
words, it is beneficial to point out suspicious section in a
program, and security analysts can perform further analysis
on them. To achieve these goals, we first analyze the raw byte
contents of programs and split it into blocks of byte sequences.
We then calculate entropy for each block and transform it into
color images. The color images have been proven to be more
effective than the gray scale counterpart by the work [36].
B. Input Transformation
In this section, we explore multiple ways to encode and
transform the binary input into images. First, we start with a
simple technique called the Byte class
1) Byte class: This scheme only includes information about
strings. Specifically, a character belongs to one of the four
categories: the lowest byte value (0), the highest, lowest byte
value, the printable strings, and non-printable strings. For
example Tab (09), newline (0a) and carriage return (0d) are
considered to be texts. This method can be used to get an
overview of the file structure.
2) Gradient based: Gradient color scheme is similar to the
byteclass method except that they vary colors with byte ordinal
values, which is from 0 to 255.
This scheme can reveal structural details that do not appear
in the byteclass scheme.
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Fig. 2. Pineline of our Convolutional Transformation Network for malware classification.
Fig. 3. Detail selection
3) Hilbert: The detail colors scheme assigns a color to
each different byte value. It tries to maximize the difference
between colors, while at the same time keeping colors for
bytes that are close in value as similar as possible. To balance
these two conflicting constraints, we again resort to the Hilbert
curve. In this paper, we project the 1-dimensional sequence of
byte values into a 3-dimensional Hilbert curve traversal of
RGB color cube.
4) Entropy: Entropy is used to detect packed or encrypted
malware [37]. In this method a file is read from the beginning,
and divided into blocks of byte sequences. Using the Shannon
Entropy [38]:
H(X) = −
N−1∑
i=0
pilogbpi (1)
where X is a random variable of 256 symbol map of N ;
i = 0, . . . , 255; block size b is the block size. The probability
mass function, pi is the probability of byte value i within a
given byte block. Entropy values are then rescaled to between
0 and 1. We assign entropy values to printable and encoded
strings, and transform them into color RGB images.
C. Hybrid Image Transformation (HIT)
We extend the entropy color scheme in the previous section
to capture more semantic information about PE files. By
encoding byte values in a wide range, HIT can not only
capture obfuscation information but also be able to represent
semantic information in the file headers like imported func-
tions or libraries. We encode the semantic information into
the green channel of RGB image. To select the best number
of partitions in the 256 symbols, we base on the observation
that information in the PE headers exists in a visible form of
strings and numbers. We start by splitting the symbol range
into 4 smaller ranges of lowest, highest, printable and other
bytes, and keep splitting the range by a binary value 2n where
n is the index of partition until getting the best performance.
We reserve the red and blue as same as entropy method and put
more light to green channel on standard characters. Table II
illustrates a typical example of byte splitting and encoding.
The motivation behind our color scheme is that a detailed
image can improve classification performance [39] and by
using more ranges of byte values metadata information such
as PE headers, in an executable can be visually identified.
As almost malware samples are packed to hinder the analysis,
HIT can be applied to detect not only obfuscation patterns and
malicious indicators in executables. A regular binary has lower
entropy than a packed binary since its follow a software coding
standard and contains printable characters. Packed malware
has higher entropy than benign since obfuscated or packed
makes bytes randomly.
We store entropy information into the red and blue channels
while put string information into the green channel as it is most
sensitive to human vision [40] and take highest coefficient
value in image grayscale-color conversion. In particular, our
HIT method defines entropy value for red and blue and fixed
green value by a binary value 2n, where n is the index of
partition. Thus, HIT can output a lower entropy value that
makes red and blue lower, and a pixel tends to green. By
this way, regular files have more green pixel than malicious
files, which contain higher entropy due to the higher red/blue
values.
Designing HIT, however, requires selecting the number of
partitions. If we divide the color range into many partitions,
the output pixels in the image are going to be random since
the patterns were removed. Furthermore, when the number of
partitions increases, the classifiers learn patterns from an image
because it contains random pixels or the training process are
easier to be overfitted. We do a heuristic search for the best
cut.
D. Network Layers
There exist standard convolutional/pooling layers that
widely used in image classification such as AlexNet [16]. In
our work, we design a simple neural network which can be
used to extract features from images. In particular, our CTN
model contains three convolutional layers, two pooling layers,
4
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON. THE BEST PERFORMANCE OF EACH CATEGORY IS HIGHLIGHTED WITH BOLDFACE FONT.
Scheme Training (GIST) Validation (GIST) Training (CNN) Validation (CNN)
Class 90.78 81.81 94.50 94.40
Gray 93.57 94.27 97.62 95.31
Hilbert 88.88 82.32 93.42 96.61
Gradient 88.41 82.91 97.57 93.23
Entropy 88.76 77.77 97.42 93.88
HIT 91.15 84.34 98.82 99.14
TABLE II
MAPPING TABLE FOR 8 RANGES
Byte value Bytes
0 RGB(r, 0, b)
255 RGB(r, 255, b)
[a-w] RGB(r, 126, b)
[A-W] RGB(r, 64, b)
[0-9] RGB(r, 32, b)
special character RGB(r, 16, b)
and one fully connected layer, respectively, to learn to classify
transformed images automatically. Note that the input of our
network is the transformed images, as discussed earlier. Fig. 2
represents network operators used in our model.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Dataset
For the evaluation, we collected malware samples from
Virusshare [41] and Windows executable software as benign
files. We utilize the Microsoft Software Removal Tool [42] to
label the samples. Our dataset contains 525 malicious and 525
benign selected samples. We further partition the dataset into
two parts: the training set (80%), the validation set (20%).
B. Experimental Results
We first conduct the parameter selection. As shown in
Fig. 3, our proposed model achieves the best performance
at the cut point 8. In case we increase the cut point to 16,
the performance of the model is decreasing as more random
pixels cannot be learned well. Also, it slows down and overfits
classifiers. Therefore, we adopt the cut point 8 for the rest of
our experiments.
Table I demonstrates the performance of different image
transformation methods and different image features. CNN
generally performs better than GIST. Our HIT performs the
best on both training set and test set. That means the HIT can
be able to generalize well on unseen samples. The performance
on the training set is generally better than the one on the vali-
dation. There is one exception that the entropy transformation
performs better with new unseen data on CNN. Regarding the
GIST feature, the gray image transformation performs the best
with 94.27%. While using CNN features, HIT reaches the top
performance with 99.14% accuracy. The results indicates that
(a) Benign average (b) Malicious average
Fig. 4. Mean output of benign (left) and malicious (right) samples.
using color images with CNN architecture is better than gray
scale images.
Fig. 4 visualizes the output average taken from the last
network in our model. We can observe that the mean outputs
of benign and malicious samples are different. Fig. 4(a) shows
that benign samples in average have almost locations in the
green regions while malicious samples have more sections in
the dark blue regions, as shown in Fig. 4(b). It obviously
indicates that malware is evolved with obfuscation techniques
to hide visible indicators.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a Convolutional Transformation
Network for malware classification based on the combination
of deep learning and the conversion of binary files into color
images. In other words, we cast the malware classification
problem into the image classification task. We improve the
accuracy rate by enhancing the image color coding. The results
of malware classification show that our method achieves over
99.14% regarding accuracy surpassing all the baselines.
In the future, we would like to extend our work to the
malware segmentation problem to detect the specific malicious
segments inside malware programs. Also, we also aim to
investigate our work to polymorphism malware classification.
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